Boyce, K. (2026). How not to avoid the problems of old evidence and normalizability for fine-tuning. Synthese, 208(1), 37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05695-7

Boyce, K. (2026). Sceptical theists can endorse the fine-tuning argument. Religious Studies, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412525101406

Boyce, K. (2026). On essentialist and anti-essentialist replies to the This-Universe Objection. Analysis, 86(1), 14–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae096

Boyce, K., & Swenson, P. (2026). The fine-tuning argument against the multiverse. The Philosophical Quarterly, 76(1), 39–50.. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae068

Boyce, K. (2025) Contradictory Christ without contradictory Christology. In J. Rutledge (Ed.), Paradox and contradiction in theology (pp. 66-78). Routledge University Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003319221

Boyce, K. (2025). On essentialist and anti-essentialist replies to the This-Universe objection. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae096

Boyce, K. (2025). Free will and providence. In T. Goldschmidt & D. Rynhold (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Jewish Philosophy (pp. 81-92). Routledge University Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032693859-11

Boyce, K. (2023, March 28). The fine-tuning argument against the multiverse. Blog of the APA. https://blog.apaonline.org/2023/03/28/the-fine-tuning-argument-against-the-multiverse/

Boyce, K., & Moon, A. (2023). An explanationist defense of proper functionalism. In L.R.G. Oliveira (Ed.), Externalism about knowledge (pp. 277-300). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866749.003.0011

Bailey, A.M., & Boyce, K. (2022). Thomas M. Ward, DIVINE IDEAS. [Review of the book Divine Ideas, by T.M. Ward]. Faith and philosophy: Journal of the society of Christian philosophers, 39(1), 158-162. https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2022.39.1.7

Boyce, K. (2021). Why inference to the best explanation doesn’t secure empirical grounds for mathematical Platonism. Synthese, 198(1), 583-595. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02043-2

Boyce, K. (2020). Mathematical surrealism as an alternative to easy-road fictionalism. Philosophical Studies, 177, 2815–2835. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01340-x

Boyce, K. (2020). Mathematical application and the no confirmation thesis. Analysis, 80(1), 11–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz021

Boyce, K. (2018). The coincidentalist reply to the no-miracles argument. Erkenntnis, 83(5), 929-946. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9920-4

Boyce, K., & Moon, A. (2016). In defense of proper functionalism: Cognitive science takes on Swampman. Synthese, 193, 2987-3001. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0899-6

Boyce, K. (2016). Proper functionalism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/prop-fun/

Boyce, K., & Hazlett, A. (2016). Multi-peer disagreement and the preface paradox. Ratio, 29(1), 29-41. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12075

Boyce, K. (2014). Some considerations concerning CORNEA, global skepticism, and trust. In T. Dougherty and J.P. McBrayer (Eds.), Skeptical theism: New essays (pp. 103-114). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.003.0008

Boyce, K. (2014). On the equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s paradoxes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 45, 32-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.12.002

Boyce, K. (2014). Existentialism entails anti-haecceitism. Philosophical Studies, 168, 297-326. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0130-x

Boyce, K., & Plantinga, A. (2012). Proper functionalism. In A. Cullison (Ed.), The Continuum companion to epistemology (pp. 124-140). Continuum Press. http://digital.casalini.it/9781472585783

Boyce, K. (2011). Non-moral evil and the free will defense. Faith and Philosophy, 28(4), 371-384. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201128438