Engagements with aesthetic value pervade human life. Aesthetic engagements are not merely ubiquitous in human life, but also sometimes momentous, often formative or transformative; crucial for who we are. But is there anything worthy of the name aesthetic agency? 

Until very recently, there has been virtually no discussion of aesthetic agency. I propose that the scarcity of discussions about aesthetic agency is likely explained by the fact that aesthetics has traditionally focused not on action, but on appreciation, while the standard approach to agency in philosophy identifies ‘agency’ with the will, and, more specifically, with the capacity for intentional action. However, I argue, first, that this identification is unfortunate since it fails to do justice to the fact that we standardly attribute beliefs, and conative and affective attitudes that aren’t formed ‘at will,’ including aesthetic appreciation, to people’s agency. The Practical Approach to agency, which identifies agency with the will, is unfaithful to this phenomenon that shapes our emotional and conative life. Fortunately, I argue further, we need not abide by this Practical Approach, but can develop an alternative: the Authority Approach to rational agency, which does justice to the widespread practice of rationally assessing, reactively responding to, and holding people responsible for non-voluntary attitudes, particularly, I show, for affective attitudes. This is very good news for aesthetics since, I argue additionally, any account of aesthetic agency that accepts the Practical Approach, and focuses on aesthetic actions fails to provide a genuine notion of aesthetic agency.