Dr. Poston will present the findings of a paper with the same title, co-authored with Kevin McCain.

Abstract: 

We investigate the relationship between explanatory reasoning and informativeness, challenging Bas van Fraassen's critique that informational virtues do not constitute confirmational virtues. Through an examination of explanatory reasoning, we illustrate how such reasoning frequently involves the addition of beliefs to make sense of observed phenomena. This process, while seemingly reducing the overall probability of a belief set, does not necessarily compromise the pursuit of accurate beliefs about the world. By critiquing the argument that new beliefs should only be added if they increase the overall likelihood of the belief set, the authors argue against a form of skepticism that undermines the foundation of explanatory reasoning. The failure of this skeptical argument is instructive as it reveals the flaw in van Fraassen’s analogous critique of informational virtues. We further explore the nuances of belief addition, emphasizing the distinction between the weight and balance of evidence, and how explanatory reasoning enhances our understanding without necessarily adhering to infallibilism about justification. Ultimately, we contend that van Fraassen's skepticism overlooks the substantial epistemic value of informational explanatory virtues. These virtues play a crucial role in advancing our knowledge and understanding of the world. Hence, the notion that explanatory reasoning is epistemically unfounded is misguided.