Matthew McGrath

Matthew McGrath
Professor, Department Chair
439 Strickland Hall
573-882-6546
PDF Documents: 
Research Interests: 

Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Perception

Education: 

Ph.D.  Brown University

M.A. University of Texas

B.A. University of Notre Dame

Select Publications: 
  • "Knowing What Things Look Like," The Philosophical Review 126:1 (2017): 1-41.
  • "Looks and Perceptual Justification, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)
  • Perceptual Reasons" (with Juan Comesana), Philosophical Studies (online first).
  • Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction (with Alvin Goldman), Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • "Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The 'Bad Basis' Counterexamples," in C. Tucker (ed) Seemings and Justification (Oxford University Press, 2013, 225-47)
  • "Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86:3 (2013): 533-66.  
  • Knowledge in an Uncertain World (with Jeremy Fantl), Oxford University Press, 2009.
  • “Conciliatory Metaontology and the Vindication of Common Sense,” Noûs 42:3 (2008): 482-508.
  • “Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. 3 (2007): 143-176.
  • “What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 666-688.
  • “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification” (with Jeremy Fantl), The Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 67-94.
  • “Weak Deflationism,” Mind 106 (1997): 69-98.