To order someone to φ, the speaker must have the practical authority necessary to give that order. However, recent accounts of a speaker’s practical authority cannot explain how a speaker can experience discursive injustice: a systematic inability to perform certain speech acts because of their social identity. Recent work in the philosophy of language has studied how, for example, women in social positions of high-rank may still experience the inability to give orders to others within their institutions.
Philosophy Graduate Student Organization
Adam Elga (2010) has argued that, even when no particular subjective probability is required by one’s evidence, perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective probabilities. Otherwise, they would be rationally permitted to knowingly turn down some sure gains. I argue that, for mainly the same reasons, perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective values. A noteworthy implication is that even arbitrarily sharpened subjective values can be practically authoritative.
The Philosophy GSO has planned a party to foster community, build relationships, and welcome new faces to the department. It is a little last minute. Better late than never to spend good time together. The whole department is welcome. Food will be provided.
Have fun, relax, and chill with good company
Food and (non-alcoholic) Drink: Provided
By Joe Jonas
By Argon Gruber
By Fernando Alvear
We will talk about software tools that can help us in our multiple tasks in academic philosophy. In particular, Argon Gruber will present some advanced functions in Excel, Al Wilsey will present productivity apps and suggestions to go paperless, and I will present an overview of Latex (the document preparation system) and the workflow Qualtrics+SPSS (for data gathering and analysis). While the presentations will not be exhaustive, the idea is to gain awareness of these tools and the ways in which they might be useful for our tasks.