New web address

October 24th, 2008

After finding the site via Google, it appears Show-Me has moved to a new web address.  I wish this would have been announced beforehand, so that folks would have had the opportunity to change their blogrolls and bookmarks! Now I’m afraid that Show-Me will lose a lot of its traffic (whatever that may be), which would be unfortunate given its career thus far.  (Blogs wax and wane, of course, but this one has been fairly consistent.) 

So: if you’re a member of a group blog, say, and you’ve managed to find your way back, please update your blogroll! 

 p.s. perhaps an admin wouldn’t mind sharing the reasons for the change? 

Second Level Potential Epistemic Awareness

September 16th, 2008

This is a question directed mainly towards those in Markie’s Epistemology seminar, but others are more than welcome to answer since it’s a pretty simple question.

Bergmann thinks up a theory in which it is “highly uncommon” to be even potentially aware of the factors that lead to justification for your belief. This leads him to reject the assertion that this is an internalist theory because there are certain people who aren’t even potentially aware of the factors that give justification. Internalism states that you must be at least potentially aware of these factors.

Even though there are some people who are not potentially aware of their justification, does that mean that this theory is not an internalist theory? You very well potentially could be part of that “highly uncommon” demographic, thus being potentially aware of the factors that give your belief justification.

My question is this: is this potential for potential (let’s call it second level potential) different in some way which makes the theory presented not an internalist theory? My intuitions point to no, but feedback is appreciated.

Impossible Properties?

September 7th, 2008

This post is primarily aimed towards those in the metaphysics seminar, but anybody’s comments are welcome.  Should realists believe that there are universals such as square circles?  Does anybody know what the main views are on this?

Social Bundle Theory of Identity or “Part of me died”

September 1st, 2008

One afternoon in high school, I dropped my keys when unlocking my door. Let’s say that I don’t remember this and that nobody else was around to see it. It has no effect on my subconscious. It has no biological effect on me either, that is, it’s unlike dreamless sleep. This event has essentially no effect on how I acted after it happened. Is this particular experience important to my identity? If this event was somehow removed from my past, would I be the same person or would I be someone different?

Before answering these questions, we must realize that there are probably thousands of experiences like this that make up a large chronological part of our lives. Now let’s say that there was someone who was driving by at the time and saw me drop my keys and remembers it vividly for one reason or another. Even if I were to ask everyone who ever experienced any part of my life to put together the most detailed account of my life, there would clearly be some parts still missing. But then if my mother dies, a large number of experiences that I don’t remember and she does (changing my diaper, etc) would become unreachable.

If we did assume that events others remember which we do not are part of our identity (which is a fair assumption considering how much we don’t remember from our childhood), then would the saying “part of me died” when a person close to you dies be more accure than we think?

A question about duties to prospective children

August 4th, 2008

Consider two sets of parents who are considering whether to have a child:

A and B know that if they create their child he will (through no fault of his own) have a very bad life. If they don’t choose to create him, he will never exist.

C and D know that if they create their child he will have a very bad life and he will be morally responsible for the fact that he has a bad life. If they don’t choose to create him, he will never exist.

If we say that A and B have a duty to their prospective child to not create him should we say the same thing about C and D? Are there any moral reasons that A and B have for not reproducing that do not also apply to C and D?

Taking the cracker was wrong

July 15th, 2008

An incident recently occured in which someone took a communion wafer from a Catholic Mass. (See news story link below.)Suppose that the Catholics are mistaken and that the wafer in question is not of spiritual significance. Even under these conditions, I think that it was most likely a serious moral wrong to take the wafer. The wafer was initially the property of the church and I doubt that those receiving communion gained the right to take the wafer (in an uneaten state) from the church. Furthermore, since the item taken was of great importance to the owner, the wrong was a serious one.
 

Apparently the rules of the church require that the communion wafer be eaten immediately. I doubt that (in this context) the priest’s act of handing the wafer to the recipient transfers unconditional property rights to the recipient. Given the context, the priest is probably only granting the recipient the right to own the wafer given that he follows church rules concerning its use.
 

[Suppose it is well known that A doesn’t want his car to be driven on unpaved roads and would never knowingly consent to his car being driven on an unpaved road. When B asks to borrow A’s car and A agrees, it doesn’t seem that A has consented to B’s driving his car no matter what, rather, A has only agreed to B’s driving it on paved roads.]
 

Even if you think that the priest is consenting to giving the recipient full ownership of the wafer. It seems plausible to hold that the priest’s consent was invalid. Consent is invalid in cases where one party has insufficient knowledge of the nature of the agreement, and I doubt the priest believed he was consenting to the wafer being used in a manner which violated the church’s rules. Furthermore, the recipient’s going up to accept communion probably led the priest to believe that he would immediately consume the wafer. This type of behavior could invalidate consent.
 

Normally if someone takes a wafer which belongs to someone else we would say that it is at most a trivial wrong. However, this is because wafers are generally of little importance to their owners. When an owner cares quite a bit about an object (even when it has no objective value) it is seriously wrong to steal it.
 

[Imagine that A owns a painting that is quite terrible but is thought by A (and a few of his friends) to be an impressive work of art. As a result A places a great deal of importance on the painting and is much happier because he owns it. In this case it would be seriously wrong for B to steal and destroy the painting even though it might not have been seriously wrong if A had not cared at all about the painting.]
So it looks like taking a cracker can be a serious moral wrong :)
News article here: http://www.wftv.com/news/16806050/detail.html 

I first read about this on Leiter’s site. His post is here: http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2008/07/biologist-myers.html

 

Call for Papers: Pacific Regional Meeting of the SCP

July 10th, 2008

Call for Papers

The Society of Christian Philosophers
Pacific Division

presents

Mind, Body, and Free Will

October 30th, 2008 – November 1st, 2008
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, CA

Plenary Speaker: Richard Swinburne
(Oxford University)

Papers on any topic of philosophical interest will be considered. The SCP
welcomes participation from both Christians and non-Christians as presenters,
commentators, and session chairs. Submissions should have a reading time of
20 to 30 minutes and be prepared for blind review—electronic submissions
preferred. Please indicate in your cover letter whether, should your paper
not be accepted, you would be willing to serve as a commentator or session
chair. For further information as the conference approaches, please continue
to check the conference website.

Deadline for submission: September 1st, 2008.

Send submissions and requests to comment or chair to pacificscp@gmail.com (.doc, .pdf, or .rtf format), or to:

UCR Department of Philosophy
ATTN: 2008 Pacific SCP
HMNSS Building, Room 1604
900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521

This conference is made possible by the generous contributions of:

Perpetuating oppression–always wrong?

July 8th, 2008

In a recent column, Ellen Goodman writes about the increasingly common practice of hymenoplasty—a medical procedure to replace the hymens of women who are no longer virgins.  The justification for the procedure is that it potentially protects women living in cultures that consider bridal virginity to be mandatory for the sake of honor and decency from the sort of consequences that these women would suffer if their would-be grooms and families ever discovered that they hadn’t waited until marriage to have sex.

In this post I’m particularly interested in a comment that Ms. Goodman includes in her column from a representative of the French gynecological association (France being a country where these procedures are becoming increasingly common).  Even if we take for granted that the zealous insistence on female (but usually not male) virginity at the time of marriage is an outdated and wrongheaded view, it’s still not clear to me that the doctors who perform hymenoplasty operations are doing anything wrong. Read the rest of this entry »

Johnston on Practice-Dependent Justification

June 27th, 2008

Mark Johnston thinks that there is a difference between a cloud and the molecules that constitute the cloud.  He thinks that there is a difference between an F and its F-shaped constituting matter.  For those who think that there is a difference, what could it be?  Johnston, as I read him, doesn’t feel a need to give an answer, and he thinks its an error to try to give an answer.  He writes that it is

the error of supposing that our practice of distinguishing Fs and their constituting matter and counting accordingly could only be justified if the distinction is secured by the independent metaphysics of the matter (Material Constitution, p. 58)

While Johnston speaks disparagingly of those who embrace this error, I still don’t understand why it’s an error.  The best I could make of Johnston’s take on how to justify the difference between an F and the F-shaped matter that constitutes it is that we talk in our ordinary language in such a way that it is useful to think that Fs and their F-shaped matters that constitute them are different.  But that doesn’t tell me at all how an F and its F-shaped matter are different.  It doesn’t tell me how the statue Goliath and the lump of clay that composes him is different.  Any help?

Property Individuation

June 27th, 2008

Are the following properties different?

1) the property being green

2) the property being green and being such that 1+1=2.