Show-Me the Argument

Fantl and McGrath use a case like the following.  It matters very little to Smith whether a train will make various stops.  Smith asks a man he’s been conversing with if the train will make the various stops.  Casually, the man says “yep, the upcoming train makes those stops; I just checked the ticket.”  The man has no indicators which make him look unreliable.  Supposing it’s true that the train will make the stops and Smith believes this, we are inclined to say that Smith knows that the train will make various stops. (more…)

In Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley asks us to consider the following case, which he calls ‘Ignorant High Stakes’ (IHS):

Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon.  They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks.  Since they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday.  But neither Hannah nor Sarah is aware of the impending bill, nor of the paucity of available funds.  Looking at the lines, Hannah says to Sarah, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning.  So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.’ (p. 5)

Stanley then writes that “our reaction is that Hannah’s utterance of ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow’ is false”.

In a previous post (http://philosophy.missouri.edu/show-me/?p=328#comments), I asked people’s intuitions about this case.  Many said that they don’t have Stanley’s intuition, although one person did.

But what if we revised IHS so that Hannah ought to know that there are high stakes.  Suppose Hannah had been reminded of hte bill by the landlady or suppose she knew that she should write accounts of her bills in her planner, but had neglected to do so.  Call this revision of the case ‘Culpably Ignorant High Stakes’ (CIHS).

Are people still inclined to think that Hannah knows in CIHS?  I really could use people’s intuitions on this matter, even if you don’t focus on epistemology.

Peter Markie’s review (Phil. Quarterly 58, July 2008) of Bergmann’s book Justification Without Awareness is out.  It’s a very nice and clear review, and it’s fun to see some of the discussion from our reading group on Bergmann’s book (two summers ago) come to fruition in this publication.

I want to consider one of Markie’s objections to Bergmann’s arguments.  (more…)

Suppose I believe that the widgets I see are red.  I am appeared to redly, and my visual faculties are working as most humans’ visual faculties would work.  There’s nothing abnormal about the situation.  Intuitively, I know that the widgets are red.

Suppose, then, that a lying factory worker (whom I don’t know is a liar, but looks like an ordinary factory worker) walks in and tells me that there are red lights shining on the widgets.  Intuitively, I now have a defeater for my belief that they are red.  I ought to withhold belief.  If I continued to believe, my true belief would no longer be warranted (where ‘warrant’ is used to designate whatever turns a true belief into knowledge).

Note that there were certain faculties responsible for my forming belief that the widgets are red (mostly visual faculties), and there was a different set of faculties responsible for my coming to withhold belief (my aural faculties, faculties responsible for taking account of testimony, etc.).

Let’s revise the case in the following way.  Suppose, instead, that when the factory worker tells me that there are red lights shining on the widgets, my aural faculties suddenly and momentarily malfunction (I get hit by a stray cosmic ray) so that I do not end up hearing what the factory worker says.  I smile and nod, the factory worker smiles and nods, and then he walks away.  I continue to believe that the widgets are red, guessing that what the factory worker had to say was something like, “Hello, the weather sure is nice today!”

Intuitively, is my belief no longer warranted?  Or does my true belief not count as knowledge?