Archive for January, 2008

What is pacifism?

Wednesday, January 30th, 2008
I’m really not sure.  But, in my un-sure state, it strikes me that pacifism is going to be either trivial or obviously false.  On the trivial side, pacifism may just be the claim that individuals (or collectives) ought to refrain from violence unless absolutely necessary.  Well, yeah.  But on the obviously false side, pacifism may be the claim the use of violence by individuals (or collectives) is never morally permissible.  Well, that’s crazy. 
Off the top of my head, the best case I can make for the crazy version is to argue that pacifism is true for wholly contingent reasons having to do with some odd way God exercises providential control over the world.  Say God has set things up so that, as it happens, every time someone engages in violence (or would engage in violence), there’s a net loss of happiness (or whatever good you prefer).  Then the utilitarian line has it that it’s never morally permissible to engage in violence.  Hence, pacifism, I guess.  But it seems quite implausible to think that violence never secures (and could never secure) a greater balance of good over evil than refraining from violence.  So anyone claiming that God exercises this sort of providence better have some pretty awesome story to tell. 
Anyone care to share a non-trivial and non-obviously false version of something still worth calling pacifism? 

Posted in Ethical Theory, Social/Political | 140 Comments »

What is the Meatrix?

Tuesday, January 22nd, 2008

For all you Matrix fans, here’s the anti-factory farm version.

Posted in Frivolity | 81 Comments »

Background Conditions Affect Phenomenology

Thursday, January 17th, 2008

There is a good deal of talk in the philosophy of mind and, from what I can tell, in the scientific community in general about the impact of background conditions on phenomenology.  It seems that what one believes, desires, expects, etc. can actually alter the phenomenal character of an experience.  As an anecdotal piece of evidence, consider this recent test that showed that people experienced more pleasure when drinking a wine that they believed was more expensive.

This is important for a number of reasons.  First, if phenomenology is closely linked with the representational content of an experience (a view known as ‘representationalism’), then it seems that background conditions can affect the content of an experience.  Second, if one is convinced that the phenomenal character of an experience is a physically realized type, then it seems that background conditions can actually shift the location of the brain responsible for phenomenal experience.  Are there other important implications I’m missing?

Posted in Philosophy of Mind | 263 Comments »

McGinn and Honderich on the NY Times

Monday, January 14th, 2008

Discussion of Colin McGinn’s review of Ted Honderich’s book has appeared in the N.Y. Times.  I wonder how this reflects on philosophers?

Posted in Uncategorized | 60 Comments »

A common mistake about open theism

Saturday, January 12th, 2008

is to say that open theists, as a matter of definition, deny that God knows everything that will happen in the future. No doubt some open theists do deny this (such as, as far as I understand, Peter van Inwagen), but it isn’t entailed by the position. (I’ll set PvI style open theists to the side, for the purposes of this post.) But I see lots of folks making this mistake, including really good philosophers. (For instance, Dean Zimmerman says the open theist denies “that God has knowledge, at all times, … of everything that will occur.” [top of p.4]) (more…)

Posted in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion | 4,068 Comments »

Arguments for Divine Command Theory

Thursday, January 10th, 2008

Let ‘Divine Command Theory’ (DCT) refer to the view that acts are right, wrong or obligatory because of God’s commands.  It’s hard to see what an argument for DCT would look like–all of the standard arguments that connect God and morality show (at best) that there is a necessary connection between what God commands and what is morally right or wrong (e.g. X is wrong iff X is forbidden by God).  But, of course, this isn’t enough to show that these acts are wrong because of the commands, and hence this isn’t enough to establish DCT.  However, Philip Quinn suggests the following line of argument: Old Testament characters are commanded to do some pretty awful stuff by God.  For example, Abraham is commanded to kill his son, Isaac, the Israelites are commanded to commit genocide against the Canaanites, Hosea is commanded to commit adultery, etc.  Quinn suggests that the best explanation for this data is that these acts were not wrong on those occasions and, furthermore, the best explanation for why they were not wrong on those occasions was because of God’s commands.  Hence, God’s commands have the power to make actions right or wrong.  More below the fold…

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Posted in Ethical Theory | 124 Comments »

Smiles and Unlearned Doxastic Responses

Wednesday, January 9th, 2008

In this post, I argue that we have unlearned justified beliefs about the happiness of other beings.  These are not learned, but wired.

When Sally sees her mother smile, she forms the belief that her mother is happy.  It is prima facie plausible that when we are appeared to smilingly (i.e., when we have the sensory experience which typically accompanies seeing someone smile), we have been wired (by God or evolution or whatever) to form the belief that the person is happy.  I think this is plausible in itself.

But some might say that this is a learned doxastic response.  (more…)

Posted in Epistemology | 70 Comments »

60th Philosopher’s Carnival

Monday, January 7th, 2008

is here. The post, “The Train Case and the Hospital Case?” by me (Andrew Moon) is up there.  Don’t forget that you can go here to the main philosopher’s carnival website where you can nominate a philosophy post (including posts from Show Me)!

Posted in Uncategorized | 52 Comments »

Is Physicalism About the Mind Evidence against Theism?

Thursday, January 3rd, 2008

Andrew Melnyk thinks so. To read his full post, go here, but below I reproduce the relevant paragraph:

Physicalism about the human mind is logically consistent with theism….However, physicalism about the human mind is still evidentially relevant to theism. The hypothesis of theism, as typically understood by philosophers, says there exists a special, nonhuman kind of person–God–who enjoys unlimited versions of the capacities to know, to love, and to decide to act that human persons possess. But since these capacities are mental, and since God is supposed to have no physical body or brain, the hypothesis of theism must say there exists a nonphysical and nonphysically realized mind. Now, if we want to assess the probability of theism given the available evidence, we must first assess its prior probability, i.e., its probability given our background knowledge. However, given theism’s commitment to a nonphysical and nonphysically realized mind, its prior probability will be raised if we already know of examples of nonphysical and nonphysically realized minds (even if those minds, unlike the hypothesized divine mind, are finite). Thus, if we learn that human minds are neither physical nor physically realized, the prior probability of theism will get a boost. By the same token, however, if we learn that human minds are physically realized, so that we don’t already know of any examples of nonphysical and nonphysically realized minds, then the prior probability of theism will fail to get that boost. To the extent that physicalism about the human mind rather than dualism is well evidenced, therefore, theism should be assigned a lower prior probability.

I explain why I don’t think that physicalism about the mind is evidence against theism below the fold.

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Posted in Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Religion | 125 Comments »