Archive for September, 2007

What’s Wrong With Theistic Belief?

Tuesday, September 25th, 2007

It’s commonly thought in many philosophical circles that there’s something epistemically faulty about theistic belief.  For example, when Leiter came for our Kline conference last semester, he certainly gave the impression that you could just take this for granted (and Shelly Kagan called him out on this during dinner).  What I also notice about many who have this attitude is a clear ignorance or lack of engagement with contemporary religious epistemology.  And the defenses of theistic belief among religious epistemologists haven’t been by no-name philosophers, but primarily by high caliber philosophers like Alvin Plantinga and William Alston, both well-respected for their significant contributions to analytic epistemology and phil. religion. (more…)

Decision Procedure for (some) Philosophical Problems

Tuesday, September 25th, 2007

Let me explain exactly what I mean by a “decision procedure” for philosophical problems. I propose that there is a finite number of steps one can take to determine whether or not one’s proposed philosophical solution to a compound philosophical problem is true or false. Below the fold I provide an explanation of exactly which kind of philosophical problem, the steps of the procedure, proofs for theorems used in the steps, and a proof for each step in the procedure. (more…)

Thomson’s Tiny House and McBrayer’s Island

Wednesday, September 19th, 2007

Justin once gave me the following scenario (http://philosophy.missouri.edu/show-me/?p=180#comments, see comment 11).  You are on an island with Smith.  Smith has a virus that will kill you unless you kill her in the next 24 hours.  Is it morally permissible for you to kill Smith?  My intuition: no.

But consider Thomson’s Tiny House case: “Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child… you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you’ll be crushed to death… But it cannot be concluded that you too can do nothing, that you cannot attack it to save your life.  However innocent the child may be, you do not have to wait passively while it crushes you to death.” (quoted from section 1 of her famous violinist article).

At first I agreed with Thomson.  But when I reflect on the island case, I don’t.  Is there a difference between the two cases?  Or does your conclusion on one force you to take a conclusion on the other?

Plantinga vs. Draper

Sunday, September 16th, 2007

Alvin Plantinga and Paul Draper go at it on the subject of God, evil, and evolution. This follows the debate which involved our very own Andrew Melnyk, chair of our philosophy department. Three cheers for Dr. Melnyk!

Perception of the Non-Natural

Wednesday, September 12th, 2007

Perception de re occurs when I perceive X.  Perception de dicto occurs when I perceive that X is F (where ‘F’ designates some given property).  For example, my hearing the plane is a case of perception de re and my hearing that the plane’s engine is running is perception de dicto.

Are there any plausible cases in which we have perception de dicto of a non-natural property?  I’m trying to think up cases in which (A) it is independently plausible that we can perceive that X is F and in which (B) it is pretty obvious that F designates a non-natural property.  For example, we can see that someone is in pain, so this case meets restriction (A), but it fails (B) because it is not obvious that epiphenomenalism about mental states is correct.  Are there others?

Murray on Coercion and God’s Hiddenness

Saturday, September 8th, 2007

The question: If God desires relationship with every human being, then why has he made his existence so hidden?  A standard atheist point goes something as follows: “I would believe in God if God would just make his existence apparent.  It would not be difficult for an omnipotent  being to just make a sign in the clouds saying “I am God and I exist!  Believe in Me!!!”

Michael J Murray argues (American Philosophical Quarterly 1993) that if God were to make his existence real in this way, then this would amount to coercion in such a way that it would stunt other important things that God values from us.  In coming to know that God exists in this way, we would know that there is an ultimate, perfect judge that knows each of our actions and will punish us (temporally or eternally) for each of our wrongs.  This would stunt morally significant freedom (and the ability to grow in character or “soul-making”) since there would be no reasonable alternatives for us and little temptation ever to do wrong.  For example (my own example), I would be inclined to always do the right thing if I knew my Mom was watching me every second.  Or (a more standard example) if a robber had a gun to my head, sure, I’d do what he says.  How much more would I be coerced in my actions if I knew an all-powerful, supreme judge was watching me?!  So it is incumbent upon God to not make himself as real as the above (imaginary) atheist suggests.

I can see a bunch of paths for discussion that could go with this response, but I’ll let ya’ll give a first shot at it.

Congratulations to Justin and Michael

Friday, September 7th, 2007

for getting papers accepted to the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association.  Their papers are entitled:

1) “Omissions as Causes” by Michael Hartsock

2) “Moral Responsibility, Coercion, and Guidance Control” by Justin McBrayer

Both papers, I believe, are critiquing different aspects of John Martin-Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility.

Libertarianism and Character

Wednesday, September 5th, 2007

Some Libertarians believe that an action is only wrong if it violates someone’s rights. A group of cases that these Libertarians have to deal with are cases where A can easily save B’s life but B does not have a right that A save her life. It seems that A does something wrong by not exerting minimal effort to save a life. I have often heard Libertarians give the following type of response to these cases: A does not perform an immoral action by not saving B, but if she does not save B then she is unvirtuous, has a bad character, is moral scum, etc.

I don’t think that this response is a good one. It seems to me that a necessary condition for a person’s having a very bad moral character is for her to be disposed to perform immoral actions. So if it is not immoral for A to save B, then it seems to me that A’s failing to save B does not give us a good reason for believing that A has a very bad moral character.

Two questions:

(1) Is the necessary condition I offer for having a very bad character correct?

(2) Is there an alternate response which a Libertarian could give to these types of cases?

Chalmers on Consciousness

Sunday, September 2nd, 2007

I recently read this Chalmers paper, which is forthcoming in the Blackwell Guide to Consciousness. It is an interesting article and Chalmers does a good job explaining the various approaches to consciousness. I think that fans of dualism (of various varieties) will be impressed with his sections on what he calls type-D dualism, type-E dualism, and type-F monism. I found the section on type-D dualism (interactionism) especially interesting. Anyway, I figured some show-me contributors might be interested, so here’s the link:

http://consc.net/papers/nature.pdf