I have a proof that at least one of the following (but none are acceptable):
Interesting comments thus far, but I have heard the following as a suggestion in support of the “yays”. The case supposed is one about libertarian free will. Suppose S reasons in the following way: “All philosophical accounts of free will are implausible, but libertarian free will is the least implausible of the accounts. So, while I do not have good reason to think libertarianism is plausible, I have good reason to believe libertarianism.” It should be noted that to say that some theory T is the least implausible is not equivalent to saying T is the most plausible. I do not quite think the “yays” have this right. [Note: There is an after post addendum which appears to help the "yays"!] More below the fold. (more…)
I need a quick “yay” or “nay” and a short explanation. Consider the following scenario. Agent S is considering a proposition p. For simplicity, suppose p is a very simple judgment; what we would call a particular judgment—e.g. “Act x is immoral” or “Object x is F“. Let us suppose that S has good reason to believe “p is not plausible”. Can S also have good reason to believe p? Or, to put it another way, is it possible to have good reason to believe “p is not plausible, but p is true”?
I would greatly appreciate it if y’all would check my reasoning on the following. An aporia is a set of propositions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent. A good number of philosophical problems can be given as a set of aporia. A solution has been offered, which I provide in the next paragraph, as disjoined necessary conditions for solving an aporia. I think I have found reason to reject the second disjoined condition and leave us with only the first. Tell me what you think.
Hey all,
My friend, who is a nanny, sent me the following for advice. I know it’s relatively simple (compared to some of the other stuff we talk about around here), but it was sufficiently interesting enough to me (and I know some of you are parents) for me to post on it:
the other day my three year old charge kept biting her sippy cup to the point of ruining it. her mom told her several times to stop, but by the time she did, she’d done some damage. then her mom told her that if she continued to bite it, she wasn’t going to buy her a new one and
Congratulations to some of our graduate students on recent publications or APA presentations! Please let me know if I’ve forgotten anybody!
Jason Hedderman: “A Problem for Tye’s PANIC Theory and Methodological Concern about the Representationalist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness” to be presented at the Eastern APA 2007.
Justin McBrayer: “CORNEA and Inductive Evidence”, forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy
“Process Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, and the Value of Knowledge”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 45:2 (2007)
Kevin McCain: “The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism”, forthcoming in Synthese
Eric Roark: “Is Michael Otsuka’s Conception of Robust Self-ownership Too Robust For a Left Libertarian?”, presented at Pacific APA, April 2007, winner of Jean Hampton Prize.
“Nozick’s Failed Defense of the State”, Journal of Libertarian Studies 21:1 (2007)
Yasha Rohwer: “Hierarchy Maintenance, Coalition Formation, and the Origins of Altruistic Punishment”, Philosophy of Science Proceedings.
The problem of past (non-human) animal suffering is, for the theist, one of the hardest aspects of the problem of evil. For the evil of past animal suffering does not obviously fall within the scope of traditional responses to the problem of evil. Consider, for example,the free will and soul-making defenses. The free will defense says that some evils are the result of the bad choices of free moral agents. But (without an appeal to supernatural moral agents like fallen angels or non-terrestrial aliens) there were no moral agents in the remote past, and thus the suffering of those animals can’t be explained as the result of the misuse of free will. Moreover, no soul-making response is obviously apt for such evils, since the animals can’t be improved morally by facing and overcoming evil.
Here I want to suggest that the evil of animal suffering in the remote past can be subsumed under a broad ’soul-making’ defense. (more…)
Suppose there are two agents Pro and Con. Both Pro and Con are relatively equal when it comes to epistemic proficiency. “Epistemic proficiency†will have to be a little vague here, but the general idea is that they are both equally capable in terms of reasoning and understanding the world. Further suppose that each is intellectually honest, self-reflective, and that each knows this about the other as well as their relative equality with regard to epistemic proficiency. Further suppose that Pro intuits that proposition P is true and Con intuits that proposition P is false. They each share their intuition with the other. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that intuition is the only relevant source of evidence for (or against) P; further, “intuition†here is understood as an “intellectual seeming”. As expected, they are surprised at the difference in belief; and, as expected, each would like some reason to discount the other’s belief. What reason does each have to reject the other’s intuition? Feldman contends that neither has a reason to discount the other’s intuition. I tend to think he is right. Disputants?
Cf. Feldman’s “Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement” in Epistemic Futures.