Archive for May, 2007

Discrimination, Homosexuality, and Religious Institutions

Friday, May 25th, 2007

This discussion is a continuation from the last post.  The thesis under consideration is:

(3) It is wrong for religious institutions to disallow their employees from engaging in homosexual behavior.

It is helpful to argue for (3) by arguing for the following two theses:

(4) If homosexual behavior is permissible, then it is wrong for religious institutions to disallow their employees from engaging in homosexual behavior.

(5) If homosexual behavior is wrong, then it is wrong for religious institutions to disallow their employees from engaging in homosexual behavior.

Consider (4).  There are marginalization and hurts (M&H) that homosexuals endure.  (more…)

The APA, Homosexuality, and Discrimination

Wednesday, May 16th, 2007

There was a very interesting (but LONG) discussion at Leiter’s page on whether Christian colleges that include mission statements disallowing their potential hires to practice homosexuality ought to be barred from APA advertising.  A plurality of issues came up.  Alexander Pruss (recently hired at Baylor) and Mark Murphy (Georgetown University) were the main defenders of the Christian colleges being allowed to have these sorts of mission statements.  Most everybody else seemed to be against it.

The discussion there has come to an end, but if anybody is interested, feel free to comment here.  But I recommend that you at least read Leiter’s opening post before you post a comment.

edit - Clayton pointed out to me in the first comment that I was imprecise, and he’s right.  The second sentence above should read, “Alexander Pruss (recently hired at Baylor) and Mark Murphy (Georgetown University) were the main defenders of the Christian colleges being allowed to have these sorts of mission statements and be allowed to advertise in the APA.”

“The Philosophic Importance of Alternative Worlds” or “Yet Another Complaint about Compatibilism”

Monday, May 7th, 2007

It seems to me that some philosophers are skeptical of the philosophical importance of what goes on in non-actual possible worlds for philosophical conclusions about what goes on in the actual world. I have in mind here the compatibilist who complains that what goes on in other possible worlds is irrelevant for questions of freedom. “What matters,” he insists, “is what happens in the actual sequence of events not what happens in alternative sequences. How could what happens in some nearby possible world affect whether or not the action in the actual world is free?”

But on reflection, what happens in other possible worlds is oftentimes extremely important for philosophical conclusions about what goes on in the actual world. I present 2 quick examples below the fold. If you have others, add to the list.

(more…)

Wolterstorff, Taking For Granted, Belief

Monday, May 7th, 2007

Nicholas Wolterstorff thinks that propositions such as:

(1) My introspection is reliable

(2) My sense perception is reliable

are propositions which, though most people do not believe them, they do take them for granted.  Hence, Wolterstorff thinks that there is a propositional attitude taking for granted that is distinct from belief.

Some of my folk friends agree with Wolterstorff.  They told me that they don’t think most folk believe (1) and (2) since most folk have never considered them.  They have further told me that most folk would believe (1) and (2) if they were to consider them.  But since they haven’t considered them, they do not believe them.

Are Wolterstorff and my friends correct?  Can anybody think of a reason to believe that the folk do, indeed, believe (1) and (2)?