Archive for April, 2007

Reasonable Atheism & Salvation

Monday, April 23rd, 2007

Most of us believe that our colleagues have reasonable views even when we disagree.  For example, Kenny is a compatibilist about free will and determinism, and though I think the view is false, I think that Kenny holds this view reasonably.  I think the same for a lot of atheists: I think that their belief that God does not exist is reasonable for them even though I think it’s false.

I’m wondering about the consistency of the orthodox Christian worldview–including the claim that the damned are damned because they do not believe–with the view that lots of non-believers are reasonable (this is a twist on the divine hiddenness argument).  If it is reasonable to believe P, then it’s not reasonable to believe ~P.  So belief in the existence of God is positively unreasonable for lots of people.  So why, on the Christian picture, are these people punished (or not saved) because of not believing what’s unreasonable for them?

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Posted in Philosophy of Religion | 127 Comments »

Believing and Withholding that I Might Be Wrong

Saturday, April 21st, 2007

How do believing that it’s possible that ~p and withholding belief that it’s possible that ~p relate?  (I’m concerned with epistemic possibility.)  In other words, consider the following propositions:

(1) S believes that it’s possible that ~p

(2) S withholds belief that it’s possible that ~p

Here’s what confuses me.  It seems to me that (2) entails (1).  But what’s odd is that the propositional attitudes of believing and withholding seem to be mutually exclusive.  So either (2) doesn’t entail (1) or those attitudes aren’t mutually exclusive.  Anyone have any insight?

Posted in Uncategorized | 394 Comments »

A modest argument against compatibilism

Friday, April 13th, 2007

The following is a simple, modest argument against compatibilism with respect to free will and causal determinism.  As a setup, consider Alfred Mele’s “Zygote Argument” scenario:

Diana [a goddess] creates a zygote Z in Mary.  She combines Z’s atoms as she does because she wants a certain event E to occur thirty years later.  From her knowledge of the state of the universe just prior to her creating Z and the laws of nature of her deterministic universe, she deduces that a zygote with precisely Z’s constitution located in Mary will develop into an ideally self-controlled agent [Ernie] who, in thirty years, will judge, on the basis of rational deliberation, that it is best to A and will A on the basis of that judgment, thereby bringing about E.   (p 188, Free Will and Luck)

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Posted in Action Theory | 245 Comments »

Is Religious Belief Sensitive to Evidence?

Thursday, April 12th, 2007
Some take it for granted that many religious believers’ religious beliefs are not sensitive to evidence. I think this is false (but my argument may not be very compelling). Here are two ways one’s religious belief might be sensitive to the evidence.

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Posted in Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion | 417 Comments »

Why moderate pro-lifers are inconsistent

Wednesday, April 11th, 2007

A moderate pro-lifer is one who thinks both that (A) abortion is morally wrong because it amounts to the killing of an innocent person and (B) it is not morally permissible to use force to stop doctors from performing abortions. Let’s say someone is a radical pro-lifer just in case she holds (A) and the denial of (B). A radical pro-lifer is willing to put her money where her mouth is by shooting abortion doctors, etc. So here is the inconsistency that I think most moderate pro-lifers are stuck with. Each of the following claims is endorsed by almost all moderate pro-lifers that I know, but the set is inconsistent:

1) Abortion is the killing of an innocent person.

2) It is not morally permissible to use force against a doctor who is about to perform an abortion.

3) It is morally permissible to use force against someone who is about to wrongfully kill an innocent person.

(more…)

Posted in Applied Ethics | 75 Comments »

New Evil Demon Problem Not A Problem For Most Externalists

Tuesday, April 10th, 2007

Cohen’s New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) is often used as an argument against epistemic externalism.  In Justification Without Awareness, Bergmann points out in a footnote (p. 111) that it is not a good argument against most forms of externalism.  Here’s why. (more…)

Posted in Epistemology | 466 Comments »

Kripke the Prodigy

Saturday, April 7th, 2007

I’ve heard many stories about Saul Kripke.  I remember Kvanvig once said in class that Kripke is the only philosophy prodigy of the twentieth century.

Does anyone have the facts on Kripke’s early accomplishments?  The story I heard was that when he was in high school, at around age 16, he developed semantics for modal logic.  (I assume this includes both propositional and quanitified modal logic.)  I also heard that he developed it on his own because he mistakenly thought that his local library just didn’t have the up-to-date material.  Little did he know that he himself was the first (or one of the first) to develop it.

Is this true?  Other stories I’ve heard indicate that the above paragraph exaggerates the facts - he actually did all this when he was older (maybe in college).  Anybody have the facts?

Posted in Frivolity | 9 Comments »

What is the best Pro-Choice Argument?

Thursday, April 5th, 2007

There is much discussion on this blog of Pro-Life arguments. Being largely sympathetic to these arguments, I’d like to hear what the best argument on the Pro-Choice side is. Here’s the ground rules.

(1) Let’s not worry about the case of rape or when the mother will die if she delivers the baby.

(2) Let’s not worry about early, early term abortions, say in the first month of pregnancy.

So, what is the best argument in favor of allowing the woman to choose to end her pregnancy for other reasons she sees fit - whether it be her health, the fetus’s condition (say Down’s Syndrome), or simply not to be a parent at this stage of life. Or, if you want to qualify the Pro-Choice position, how would that best be done? (i.e. when would it be permissible to abort and when would it be impermissible - and why?).

Posted in Applied Ethics | 254 Comments »

When does a Reparations Argument Suck?

Tuesday, April 3rd, 2007

A reparations argument is an argument that concludes that one person or group of people owe another person or group of people some level of compensation because of a past wrong or harm.  For example, it has been argued that certain white citizens of the United States owe reparations to certain black citizens of the United States because of the past wrongs of slavery.  Some reparations arguments seem to be good ones.  If you take my car, then you owe me certain reparation.  Other reparation arguments suck.  Plausibly, I don’t owe anything to some person because of what my ancestors did to his ancestors 10,000 years ago.  But what’s the morally relevant difference between the two cases? (more…)

Posted in Applied Ethics | 136 Comments »