Archive for March, 2007

Proofs for the existence of God: how does Theism follow?

Saturday, March 31st, 2007

With theological commitments aside, if a person accepts either a cosmological or ontological argument for a diety’s (God’s) existence, why should she or he accept that the cause or being cares about human beings? In other words, why should they not simply remain agnostic as to whether that diety is deistic or theistic?

I know this question is a bit vague as there are numerous comsological arguments as well as ontological arguments, but it seems to me that theism does not necessarily follow from the standard versions of the arguments (exception: Descartes’ argument, but this leads to a different sort of worry), i.e. ones used in intro courses. Some additional premise(s) is needed. Thus, I’m wondering how is Theism supposed to follow from the arguments. (more…)

Religious Non-Cognitivism?

Thursday, March 29th, 2007

Philosophers who are non-cognitivists about morality insist that moral judgments are not beliefs.  We don’t have moral beliefs.  Rather, when someone asserts a moral judgment, he or she is expressing a desire, emotion, etc.  One of the standard arguments for non-cognitivism relies on the truth of a view known as motivational internalism (the view that there is a necessary, conceptual connection between making a moral judgment and being defeasibly motivated in a certain way).  I’m wondering if the same sort of argument can be made about religious judgments.  If so, then granting that religious judgments are cognitive, this undermines the standard argument from internalism for non-cognitivism in morality. (more…)

Because it’s just that good.

Thursday, March 29th, 2007

You might’ve seen it before, but it struck me that some readers may be (tragically) missing out. Philosophical humor at its best: [kml_flashembed movie="http://www.youtube.com/v/xrShK-NVMIU" width="425" height="350" wmode="transparent" /]

Inclusivism/Exclusivism

Tuesday, March 27th, 2007

This post is going to be on one of those borderline topics between philosophy of religion and theology that Shaun talked about.  There’s a debate between exclusivists and inclusivists, and I just want to get the debate straight and then ask a question. (more…)

Best philosophy facilities

Monday, March 26th, 2007

As a public service for those who are weighing graduate school offers,* I hereby propose a Spring Break contest: best philosophy facilities, as determined by publicly available imagery. This is your chance to exercise your Google Images skills! Add a comment with a link to the site or photo, and we’ll take it from there.

To get things started, my vote is for Syracuse:

Syracuse philosophy facilities

* Not to help you make your decision, of course; merely as a diversion while you consider your options …

Fumerton’s Review of Bergmann’s Book

Wednesday, March 21st, 2007

Richard Fumerton has written a review of what is one of my favorite books, Justification Without Awareness, by Michael Bergmann:

http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9104

Fumerton writes, “It is one of the best books in epistemology that I have read over the past couple of decades”.

Thanks to Garrett for letting me know about this.

The Ad Hominem

Wednesday, March 21st, 2007

There are some good textbook treatments of the argumentum ad hominem, but they don’t quite capture the beast as it is found in the wild. I want to say something about those treatments and then offer an alternative account of the ad hominem.

(more…)

Pains Have Content?

Tuesday, March 20th, 2007

Kevin was filling me in on some stuff they’re doing in the Pain seminar, and he told me that most phil. mind people think that pains have content.  Some would add that this content is nonconceptual.

This, to me, sounds ludicrous.  It makes sense to me that beliefs and desires and hopes have content.  But a pain?  The pain is just a feeling - a raw sensation.  It doesn’t seem to represent anything (as all contents do).  Maybe I would be helped if I could find out two things:

1) what, exactly, is a pain supposed to represent?  (What is its content?)

2) what reason is there to think that pains do represent what you say they do?  (What reason is there to think the pains hve the contents you say they do?)  (This presupposes you gave an answer to (1)).

I think that (2) is worth asking because, unlike beliefs, hopes, and desires, whose contents are more or less on their sleeves, I can’t detect any content at all in my pain.

Is this Circular?

Friday, March 16th, 2007

Background: Patrick and I were having a discussion (inspired by an earlier discussion that we had with Eric Roark) the other day concerning whether God could be considered morally praiseworthy for his character given that he is essentially good.  I proposed that libertarians about free will whose intuitions are driven primarily by ultimate source concerns (rather than primarily by PAP concerns) might maintain that God is morally praiseworthy on account of the fact that God is the ultimate source of his own character, and that they could consistently maintain that God is the ultimate source of his own character by maintaining that the causal explanation for God’s being essentially good lies in the fact that God wills to be essentially good.  They can also, I argued, maintain that God could not have willed otherwise than to be essentially good, on account of the fact that God’s being essentially good entails that God could not do otherwise than will to be essentially good.  Patrick charged this proposal with exhibiting vicious explanatory circularity.  But, as of yet, I don’t see that my proposal does exhibit vicious explanatory circularity. (more…)

Philosopher wins large cash award

Friday, March 16th, 2007

Hello all,

Here’s an interesting story I came across about Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, who has just been named the recipient of this years Templeton Prize. Valued at $1.5 million dollars, the Templeton is the largest single annual financial award given on the basis of intellectual merit. The award is given to scholars whose work represents progress on spiritual issues, and not surprisingly, has been criticized by Richard Dawkins.

Taylor is currently at Northwestern University.