Show-Me the Argument

In the Frankfurt-style example proposed by Mele & Robb, Black has initiated a process P in Bob’s brain that will deterministically result in choice C at time t2, unless Bob freely, indeterministically chooses C at time t2. (Call Bob’s indeterministic deliberative process “X”) Why will P give way to X at t2? Mele & Robb just stipulate this. No good reason is given, except that it is possible. I suppose that is all they need to show. But it may be impossible. We can’t say that the neuron(s) that activate C can somehow recognize and favor an indeterministic process over a deterministic one, can we? Wouldn’t an indeterministic causal chain be empirically indistinguishable from a deterministic one? Can anyone think of a possible way for P to defer to X?

The more I think about it, the less “guidance” control seems more like an instance of the use of the notion of control in such a way as to assuage our intuitive need for it in any discussion of moral responsibility. To be situated in just such a way that one only seems to be causally effective in the world, is not control in any serious sense. If I am at the controls of a plane, and I happened to believe that I were flying the plane, while the auto-pilot was doing all of the work the entire time I was “flying” the plane, I don’t see how I would have control of the plane in any way. Control, as I understand it, involves one’s being able to act in such a way that the objects upon which one’s control is exercised can be manipulated to conform to one’s intentions. In the cases that F&R provide of guidance control, such as the example of the student driver, the “agent” (or relevant mechanism, if you prefer) is situated in such a way that, while they may believe themselves to be effectual, they in fact are not. The Frankfurt examples, such as the original assassin, are a better formulation of guidance control, but I would pursue the “flicker of freedom” strategy Fischer denies and claim that regulative control is actually present.

I’m having a harder time accepting guidance control as a kind of control at all, and now F&R’s language seems misleading. Other thoughts, intuitions, and philosophical explanations would be very welcome. Especially if you can fix my understanding of my control such that it does not involve one’s having any actual (effective) ability to manipulate objects to conform to one’s intentions.