In chapter 8 Fischer and Ravizza claim that in order for someone to be morally responsible she must take responsibility. They give two conditions 1 she must see herself as an agent and 2 she must see herself as a fair target for reactive attitudes. My first complaint is that although they mention that one might object that there are cases where someone doesn’t meet their taking responsibility condition yet we think the person is responsible; F&R don’t really respond to this objection. They mention problems with someone failing to meet the first condition of taking responsibility, but they don’t respond to the possibility of someone meeting the first (seeing herself as an agent) and not the second (seeing herself as a fair target for reactive attitudes). Instead of responding to this, they simply describe where their view fits in with other literature by explaining how their view is a subjectivist view. I think F&R need to offer more of a response to this objection because it seems to be a plausible objection. Consider the following case:
S is an assasin. She sees herself as an agent that can causally affect the world (ie. she meets the first part of the taking responsibility requirement). But, S does not see herself as a fair target of reactive attitudes. She is above these attitudes, she is Nietsche’s ubermench. She realizes that people may form these attitudes, but these people are mere sheep and do not realize that she is not a fair target of these attitudes. S kills several people, knowingly and willingly. It seems that she is morally responsible, but since she doesn’t meet the taking responsibility condition she is not morally responsible. This result seems to be problematic for F&R’s view.
What do you all think?