Show-Me the Argument

Alright this is my first post, so go easy on the virgin…

According to Kane, the compatibilist must clarify the meaning of the term “free” in order to make his case for free will being consistent with determinism. To be free is to be unimpeded and unconstrained from choosing or choosing otherwise if you had wanted to (p. 15). Suppose the following situation (which actually happened):

While I am diligently reading Kane and writing my commentary (are you reading this Peter?), my dog walks up to the coffee table where I have left the remains of my dinner. He looks at me and then back at the food and then back again (continued below the fold). (more…)

Consider the Frankfurt style case where Smith is choosing which of two different presidential candidates to vote for. Smith does not know that an evil genius has planted a chip in his brain with which he can control Smith’s decision if he so wishes. In this case Smith believes that he has a choice between candidate A and candidate B, but in fact he does not because if he comes close enough to deciding for candidate B then the evil genius will force him to vote for candidate A. I want to make two claims which (if true) will show that smith has morally significant alternative possibilities. (more…)

In chapter 2 of his introduction to freewill, Kane discusses that classical compatibilists claim that in cases of brainwashing the brainwashed person is not acting freely. My question is: if determinism is true, how is a case of someone being brainwashed different from a person who is not? Say I perform action A. In one case, I perform action A and I am not brainwashed. In the other case I perform action A and I am brainwashed(assume that action A is something that I have been brainwashed to do). I see no relevant difference between my performing action A in these two cases if determinism is true. If determinism is true, in both cases forces outside of my control determine me to have certain beliefs and desires that in turn lead to my performing action A. In the first case those forces are the past history of the world and the laws of nature. In the case of brainwashing, it seems like the same forces are at work, the past history of the world and the laws of nature. For example, given the past history of the world and the laws of nature, it was determined that X would brainwash me at time t. Given my condition at time t (which was determined) it was determined that X would be able to modify my beliefs and desires so that I would perform action A when the opportunity arose. It just happens that in the case where I am brainwashed interaction with X is part of what determines the formation of my beliefs and desires, whereas in the case where I am not brainwashed other things determine the formation of my beliefs and desires (interaction with other people, genetics, etc.). So, I don’t see how these cases are different in any relevant way so that I can be free in one and not in the other. The upshot of all of this is that it seems those who believe determinism is true will have to accept that when someone has been brainwashed her actions are free, which seems counterintuitive.

In Kadri Vihvelin’s “Arguments for Incompatibilism,” she says the Consequence argument fails as a reductio (i.e., fails to show that no compatibilist account of ‘could have done otherwise’ can succeed), but is useful for other reasons:

It has made it clear that the free will/determinism problem is a metaphysical problem and that the underlying issues concern questions about our abilities and powers, as well as more general questions about the nature of causation, counterfactuals, and laws of nature. … Insofar as the Consequence argument has pointed us in the direction of these deep and difficult underlying metaphysical questions, it represents a significant step forward in the discussion of one of the most intractable problems of philosophy.

So my question is addressed to proponents of the Consequence argument. Are you comfortable with this modest claim, or do you want to say that the Consequence argument does more than just point us in the direction of difficult metaphysical questions?

I just wanted to see what people think about the question that Philip raised in class today. Philip questioned if someone in a Frankfurt example knows that she has only one option available to her (I assume prior to deciding what she is going to do) does it affect her moral responsibility? I think that it does. If I know (and let’s just assume that it is infallible knowledge, i.e. God tells me or something) that I truly have only one course of action available to me and I choose that course of action, then it doesn’t seem to me that in this case I am morally responsible for choosing that course of action. My intuition is that my knowledge that I have only one option available influences my decision to choose that option to the extent that I am not responsible for that choice because by knowing that this is the only option (I assume that doing nothing is not an option) I am no longer choosing. What do you all think?