Archive for May, 2006

Oughts and desires…

Tuesday, May 30th, 2006

Consider:

1) If I morally ought not to x, then I prima facie ought not to desire to do x.

I’m not sure about exactly what sort of “ought” is in the consequent of (1). But it seems plausible that someone who desires to rape, murder, steal, etc. - someone who desires to do wrong acts - is in a state they ought not to be in. Consider also:

2) If I morally ought not to x, then I prima facie morally ought to avoid situations in which I will desire to do x.

Of course, there is a connection between (1) and (2). (Does (2) follow from (1)?) And I added the “prima facie” since I presume these moral oughts are defeasible.

Two questions:
a) What is the “ought” in the consequent in (1) supposed to be?
b) Are (1) and (2) true?

I have some more thoughts, but I’ll start with these.

Posted in Ethical Theory | 4,197 Comments »

Abstract Objects and Perception

Monday, May 22nd, 2006

Many philosophers agree that there is perceptual content. When I see that there is an orange cat on the couch, there is an orange cat on the couch is the content of my visual experience. One fact that supports the view that perception has a content is that there are perceptual illusions and hallucinations, which means that there are conditions under which the content of a perception is correct, and other conditions under which it is not.

In the debate over whether the content of perception is conceptual or nonconceptual, one issue is what the nature of perceptual content may be. (more…)

Posted in Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind | 3 Comments »

The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer

Saturday, May 13th, 2006

In his article, “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer” , Warren Quinn asks us to envision the following scenario. A “self-torturer” allows a peculiar medical device to be implanted in his body. The device generates a constant electrical current at levels of strength 1 (causing nothing in the way of pain) to 1000 (causing extreme pain). The conditions for its being implanted are as follows. The self-torturer is given an initial $10,000 for accepting the device, and is offered $10,000 each week to increase the degree of current by one unit, after which the device may never return to the lower setting. Thus, at week 1, the self-torturer is offered $10,000 to raise the current to level one. And at week 2, he is offered $10,000 to raise the current to level two; and so on, up to 1000 if he prefers. The troubling aspect of the case is that there is *no subjective difference in degrees of pain* felt by the self-torturer at any two adjacent settings. The increments of increase are simply too small to be noticed by the self-torturer. Hence, the self-torturer seems to have a repeatable reason each week to increase the level of current by one; the next level up is no worse pain-wise, and he receives $10,000 for the increase. The self-torturer thus ends up at 1000, in tremendous pain, and if it were possible would relinquish all of his earnings in order to return to 0. Quinn’s paradox is that, intuitively, we think that there ought to be a way a rational agent could take advantage of what the game offers him without thereby ending up the worse for it. Finding such a strategy, however, is difficult. (more…)

Posted in Decision Theory | 442 Comments »

What is the primary bearer of truth?

Wednesday, May 10th, 2006

Fumerton writes the following:

I take the primary bearers of truth value to be thoughts….Thoughts I take to be nonrelational properties of a mind or self, properties whose presence is logically distinct from, though no doubt dependent on, and paralleled by, brain states. Thoughts can be true or false. True thoughts correspond to or “picture” facts. False thoughts fail to correspond. A fact is a nonlinguistic complex that consists in an entity or entities exemplifying properties. The world contained facts long before it contained minds and thoughts. In one perfectly clear sense the world contained no truths before there were conscious beings, for without conscious beings there would be no bearers of truth value. (Metaepistemology and Skepticism, p. 73).

This gives the following counter-intuitive result: truth is dependent on thinkers. No thinkers, no truth. If necessary truths are propositions that are true in all possible worlds and some possible worlds lack thinkers (theists can avoid any real trouble since God’s in all possible worlds), then there are no necessary truths. But there are. So Fumerton’s wrong.

Posted in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language | 377 Comments »

God and Possible Worlds

Sunday, May 7th, 2006

Here’s an idea I’ve had about possible worlds, but I know there should be a problem with it that I can’t see. Suppose there’s a perfect God. If so, then he wouldn’t create any subpar worlds. For example, if there’s a world in which all creatures endure nothing but undeserved horrible suffering, then God wouldn’t create that world. But, since God exists in ALL possible worlds, it would be impossible for there to be a possible world such as I described because God would also exist and God’s existence would be incompatible with that world. What’s more, if there is a “best of all possible worlds” (a controversial, but plausible assumption) then that would have to be the ONLY possible world. Since God would not have created anything less than the best, the other worlds are incompatible with’s God’s existence. So, to conclude, if there’s no best world, there are many “possible worlds” (e.g. the suffering world) which are in fact not possible worlds at all, and if there is a best world, then that would be the ONLY possible world. But all of this does not seem right, so there must be a solution that I can’t see.

Posted in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion | 76 Comments »

On Philosophers’ Lifestyles and Their Politics

Friday, May 5th, 2006

To a naive graduate student who isn’t too familiar with the politics and issues of the philosophical and professorial lifestyle, this post was very interesting. I recommend reading the opening post as well as the first few comments. (There are responses by Ted Sider and Dean Zimmerman to one of the more audacious comments. Zimmerman’s is much later on.) Thanks to the person (Carter?) who mentioned this post today while we got drinks after class.

Posted in Frivolity | 3 Comments »

Aristotle’s argument for PNC

Monday, May 1st, 2006

I got some stares during the presentation of this argument during the seminar; so, I thought I might clarify here. If you see any problems, please let me know, and — to save me significant amounts of work — tell me how to solve them :)

Aristotle proposes three arguments for the Principle of Non Contradiction (hereafter PNC). The arguments are particular instances where one who wishes to deny PNC must ‘concede’ to PNC in order say something significant to begin with. The arguments take the following general form. (more…)

Posted in History of Philosophy, Logic | 1,993 Comments »

Deferring to the Experts

Monday, May 1st, 2006

The justification of many of our testimonial beliefs comes by way of expert testimony. When, for example, I believe that the mass of an electron can be calculated to within 9 significant digits I rely on information possessed by some expert. Another role testimony plays in justification is to defer to the experts to handle defeaters. I believe that the ontic interpretation of quantum mechanics is right. But when faced with evidence to the contrary by, say, an adherent defender of the Copenhagen interpretation, I can defer to the experts on this matter. What’s interesting is that my deferring serves to render ineffective the purposed defeater. (more…)

Posted in Epistemology | 299 Comments »