I want to learn some of the philosophical problems that are associated with the position within metaethics known as intuitionist realism. Some who work on the subject include Jonathan Dancy and Phillip Stratton-Lake. Could anyone provide me with an idea of what some of the major issues are here?
Thanks– Adam
I’m looking for general criticism on the argument below. Something like it has likely been argued before, but it is important to me to develop an argument myself, even if the argument’s support is only a rough sketch at the moment.
Before I get to the actual argument of this post, let me start with a brief statement of what a factory farm (a.k.a. a CAFO: confined animal feeding operation) is. (more…)
I am trying to generate an argument against Hintikka’s claim that Kap –> KaKap. The assumptions I hold that lead me to deny Kap –> KaKap are:
(a) Kap → Rap
(b) KaKap → RaRap (from (a))
Let Kap = a knows that p
Let Rap = a has reflected upon p
The Argument:
1.. (Kap → KaKap) → (Rap → RaRap) [I take this to follow from assumptions (a) and (b)]
2. ~(Rap→ RaRap)
3. ~(Kap—KaKap)
Support for premise (2): Not all those who have reflected upon a particular proposition have reflected upon reflecting upon it. (I.e. Bruce might have reflected on the table’s being brown, and yet had never reflected upon having such a reflection).
Of course, my assumptions (a) and (b) would be false if we were talking about, for example, knowledge “how”. However, Hintikka’s thesis is with regard to propositional knowledge.
I have misgivings about my argument; I waffle on whether (1) follows from accepting my two assumptions. Any thoughts?
This post is directed to (but of course not limited to) those in the Hegel seminar. Question: when Taylor refers to the “unity” of the Classical age (he makes this reference pretty frequently, and sometimes with little or no clarification), does he mean the “unity” that would be man and the world, if man were functioning in such a way that he is “in line” with the already established purpose of the world? Or, is “unity” supposed to represent some sort of unity within the individual that would be the unity of feeling and reason?? (more…)
Can Ted or someone else who took Andrew’s *Concepts* class give me a brief (paragraph or three) primer on the linguistic conception of concepts? I’d like to explore it a bit, but I want to make sure we start out with a common understanding. In particular, I’m interested in exploring precisifications of the claim that
LCC Concepts are linguistic entities.
Which I assume is the fundamental thesis of a linguistic conception of concepts.
One of the standard objections to Molinism is the circularity objection. If you’re already familiar with Molinism and the circularity objection, proceed to (B) where I present the meta-Molinist solution to the objection. If you want some background, read (A) first. (more…)
Let the term “warrant” denote that property which, when added to true belief, makes knowledge. (So S knows that p iff p is true and S has a warranted belief that p.) A question I’m interested in is whether evidence is necessary for warrant. (more…)
Show-Me the Argument has gotten a new coat of paint for the new calendar year thanks in large measure to Garrett Pendergraft. We hope you like the changes! If, for whatever reason, the fonts, posts, or images are not functioning properly on your browser, please send me an e-mail. Aside from the new design, you’ll notice that we now have a popularity function that will keep a running list of the most popular posts (calculated by a matrix using # of comments, # of views, # of trackbacks, etc.) and a category for philosophy conferences. So, if anyone finds a site advertising a conference that might be of interest, please feel free to send me the link, and I’ll add it to the conferences links. As well, we’ve added a search function that will allow you to search back through old posts/comments without having to browse by month. Enjoy.
I was thinking about the Plantinga’s solution to the divine foreknowledge problem yesterday (by way of Zagzebski’s discussion in her Freedom & Foreknowledge book) and I think there’s a problem with it. Since I’m amenable to the Ockhamist solution I’m hoping someone can point out the error of my ways.
First, a bit of background. Here’s the problem: God is essentially omniscient. Thus if God believes p then p is true. Suppose God is in time. And suppose that persons are free only if they have the power to do otherwise. This generates an argument that people aren’t free. The argument goes as follows:
1. God is essentially omniscient.
2. If (1) then God believes at t1 that I will do A at t3.
3. Necessarily, if God believes at t1 that I will do A at t3 then I will do A at t3.
4. It is necessary per accidens at t2 that God believes at t1 that I will do A at t3.
5. If it is necessary per accidens at t2 that God believes at t1 that I will do A at t3 then if necessarily God believes at t1 that I will do A at t3 only if I will do A at t3 then it is necessary per accidens that I will do A at t3.
So,
6. It is necessary per accidens that I will do A at t3.
But,
7. If (6) then I do not do A freely at t3.
Therefore,
8. I do not do A freely at t3.
The Ockhamist solution involves denying premise 4. Plantinga aims to accomplish this by defining accidental necessity in terms of the counterfactual power of agents. But there’s a problem with this: it doesn’t imply that 4 is false. (more…)