Archive for September, 2005

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Why Propositions Can’t Be Concrete

Tuesday, September 27th, 2005

In the reading for Kierland’s class, Stich quickly discards the notion that propositions are abstract objects. (more…)

Posted in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind | 90 Comments »

Can we ever justifiably consume nonrenewable resources?

Tuesday, September 27th, 2005

Can we ever acquire nonrenewable resources in such a way that it meets the Lockean Proviso? For my purposes I assume that we have to take future generations into account. My weak thesis is that we can never know with regard to nonrenewable resources that we have left “enough and as good.” Justin has suggested that I strengthen the thesis to argue that we simply cannot leave enough and as good when one consumes a nonrenewable resource (I rush to point out that he disagrees with my conclusion). I present the following in light of the weak thesis, but if the strong thesis works, just read the argument mutatis mutandis (more…)

Posted in Applied Ethics, Social/Political | 132 Comments »

What are the prospects for Christian philosophers of religion?

Monday, September 19th, 2005

Last week Andrew and I had begun a discussion about the prospects for Christian philosophers of religion to defend by sound deduction the docrines of Christianity. I argued that, since philosophy of the so-called analytic tradition will not abide contradictions, certain Christian doctrines will remain philosophically indefensible. I offered the following clear example: Christ is both fully God and fully man. One need not go to much trouble at all to think of many problems of identity that will confront the Christian philosopher. In short, logical contradiction abounds

(more…)

Posted in Philosophy of Religion | 139 Comments »

Is God’s Character Identical to the Standard of Goodness?

Sunday, September 18th, 2005

Given other traditional theistic assumptions, plus one controversial premise about properties, I think that there is a good argument that God’s character is identical to the property of maximal goodness. But, before I proceed, here’s a little background: (more…)

Posted in Ethical Theory, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion | 757 Comments »

Swapping Babies

Sunday, September 18th, 2005

Simmons makes the claim (184) that perhaps as a rule (in rule-utilitarian fashion) it will be best to let the biological parents “to have first right” to raise their children, because, ” (plausibly) the natural tenderness and natural parents are likely (as a rule) to make them the best rearers of their children.”

Here’s my reason for thinking this will not work. (I note quickly that I am not a parent, so if anyone especially parents finds my line of thought misguided then I acquiesce to your experience.)

I don’t think parents have a natural affinity or tendernees to “their child.” (more…)

Posted in Applied Ethics, Social/Political | 8 Comments »

Rule-consequentialism and duties

Wednesday, September 14th, 2005

We’ve been talking recently about the reasons for which natural rights could be infringed. Natural rights (according to Simmons’ take on Locke) are not absolute. Rule-consequentialist considerations could lead us to override the protection of some right. If rule-consequentialist reasoning provides us with strong grounds for overriding some right, is there an attendant positive duty to act accordingly? I know–duty-talk is generally anathema to consequentialists. But if one is committed to a certain set of rules that maximize overall utility, and by virtue of those rules one concludes that a right should be overridden, does one have some duty to override that right? In other words, do the “rules” of rule-consequentialism establish duties to act in certain ways? Would these duties, if they exist, be some kind of impersonal duty?

Posted in Social/Political | 56 Comments »

War-makers have duties?

Wednesday, September 14th, 2005

In Chapter 4, it is stated multiple places (194 and 196) that war-makers can lose (forfeit) their rights, but not their duties. I understand how war-makers forfeit their rights and how they still have duties with respect to those they are not at war with. Does a war-maker still have duties to the individual(s) that they are at war with and if so, why? If a war-maker is at war with all of society (sociopath or psychopath), why would the war-maker have duties?

Posted in Applied Ethics, Social/Political | 59 Comments »

A twist on a common question

Wednesday, September 14th, 2005

The comments in the thread “Procedural Rights in a State-of-Nature” developed a twist of a common question that I’d like to explore further and see what others thoughts are on it. The common question being: is it morally permissible to kill one person in order to save the lives of two other, equally-moral people? I have a bit of a problem saying yes, but the utilitarian spark in me seems to override in this case. Here’s the twist for me: is it morally permissible to kill one person in order to save two other, equally-moral people from severe harm (torture causing them to become quadriplegic for example)? Here I want to say no; the utilitarian spark getting snuffed. How would you answer both questions and what is the moral difference, if any, between the two?

Posted in Ethical Theory | 303 Comments »

The right to punish

Tuesday, September 13th, 2005

I offer the following (broadly Lockean) argument:

1) Governments (at least sometimes) have the right to punish.
2) All governmental rights are reducible to individual rights.
3) So, individuals (at least sometimes) have the right to punish.

Premise 1 is–admittedly–an appeal to intuition. It just seems that at least in some cases it is morally permissible for the government to punish a moral wrongdoer. Premise 2 is a reduction premise that is fairly standard for libertarians in specific, but something that others I’ve talked with find very plausible as well. What’s wrong with the argument?

Posted in Social/Political | 78 Comments »

Is it wrong to have sex with goats?

Tuesday, September 13th, 2005

Consider the following statement:

(1) It is morally wrong for me (Andrew Moon) to have sex with a goat.

It is clear, given my moral intuitions, that I’m at least prima facie justified in believing that (1). Not only that, but I think I am justified (simpliciter) in believing that (1) and I can’t think of any undefeated defeaters.

Important questions remain. In discussion, Jason Bernsten pointed out to me (and Ted Poston later clarified) a very obvious question: What are the nonnormative features of my having sex with a goat that make it wrong? More simply, what makes bestiality wrong? I’m not sure. Anybody have any suggestions? I’m sure there are many and I have some guesses as to an answer. But for those who think that having sex with a goat is wrong, my question is: what makes it wrong?

Posted in Applied Ethics, Epistemology, Ethical Theory | 9 Comments »

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