Show-Me the Argument

Peter Unger, in his book _Ignorance_, uses the method of opposition to argue that knowledge implies certainty. Some subtleties aside, Unger appeals to the strangeness of assertions like ‘I know it’s raining, but I’m not certain it is’ to argue for this thesis. There’s a problem, however, with this strategy: assertion carries more information than the content of the claim itself. For example, the assertion that “it’s raining” carries the implications that (a) it’s relevant to discourse and (b) that the asserter is—at least—justified in believing that it’s raining. (more…)

The concept of awareness is crucial for epistemology, and yet there is much left to be desired in discussions that incorporate the notion of awareness. I discuss some of this in my paper “Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen” (forthcoming with Phil Studies). The problem of the speckled hen shows just how hard it is to get the right kind of awareness for perceptual justification. I’m becoming more convinced that we need a much more nuanced account of the different kinds of awareness. The following (more…)