Andrew Melnyk

Professor and Chair of the Department
D.Phil., Oxford University

MelnykA@missouri.edu
439 Strickland Hall
573-882-1278
Website

vita (Word)

Research areas
philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of science

Selected publications

“What Do Philosophers Know?” [Critical notice of Timothy Williamson’s The Philosophy of Philosophy, OUP, 2007], Grazer Philosophische Studien, 80.1 (2010): 297-307.
"Conceptual and Linguistic Analysis: A Two-Step Program," Noûs 42:2 (2008): 267-291.
A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge University Press, 2003; paperback 2007.
"Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers' Inconclusive Conceivability Argument", in Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (eds.) Physicalism and Its Discontents (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
“Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious: A Critical Study of Savellos and Yalçin's Supervenience: New Essays”, Noûs, 33 (1999): 144-154.
"How to Keep the 'Physical' in Physicalism," Journal of Philosophy 94:12 (1997): 622-637.
"Two Cheers for Reductionism: Or, the Dim Prospects for Non-reductive Materialism," Philosophy of Science 62 (1995): 370-388.
“Physicalism: From Supervenience To Elimination”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), 573-587.